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NOTE
I Am Having a Flashback.. .All the Way to the Bank: The Application of
the "Thin Skull" Rule to Mental Injuries-Poole v. Copland Inc.
INTRODUCTION
The "thin skull" rule' is a concept that has been applied in North
Carolina tort cases for over thirty years.2 Previously, the "thin skull"
rule was only applied in North Carolina cases involving physical inju-
ries.3 However, on May 8, 1998, the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Poole v. Copland, Inc.4 affirmed a North Carolina Court of Appeals
ruling,5 which provided that the "thin skull" rule may be applied to
mental injury cases. This is a case of first impression in North
Carolina.
In Poole, a former employee brought an action against her former
co-worker alleging intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress.6 In addition, the employee brought suit against her former
employer for ratification of her co-worker's conduct, and the em-
ployer's imputed liability with respect to the co-worker's sexual har-
assment.7 The plaintiff recovered actual and punitive damages
resulting from a flashback of repressed memories of childhood sexual
abuse when aggravated by the on-the-job sexual harassment.8 The
1. The "thin skull" rule provides that if the defendant's "misconduct amounted to a breach
of duty to a person of ordinary susceptibility, he is liable for all damages suffered by plaintiff
notwithstanding the fact that these damages were unusually extensive because of the peculiar
susceptibility [of the plaintiff]." Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 670, 138 S.E.2d 541, 546
(1964) (quoting W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Comment Note. -Right to Recover for Emotional
Disturbance or its Physical Consequences, in the Absence of Impact or other Actionable Wrong,
64 A.L.R.2d 100, 131 n. 12 (1959).
2. The North Carolina Supreme Court first applied the "thin skull" rule in Lockwood v.
McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
3. See Lockwood, 262 N.C. at 670, 138 S.E.2d at 546 (1964); Potts v. Howser, 274 N.C. 49,
54, 161 S.E.2d 737, 742 (1968); Holtman v. Reese, 119 N.C. App. 747, 749, 460 S.E.2d 338, 341
(1995); Casey v. Fredrickson Motor Express Corp., 97 N.C. App. 49, 53, 387 S.E.2d 177, 179
(1990); Ballenger v. Burris Indus. Inc., 66 N.C. App. 556, 569, 311 S.E.2d 881, 889 (1984); Lee v.
Regan, 47 N.C. App. 544, 550, 267 S.E.2d 909, 912 (1980); Redding v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 9
N.C. App. 406, 409, 176 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1970).
4. Poole v. Copland, Inc., 348 N.C. 260, 498 S.E.2d 602 (1998).
5. Poole v. Copland, Inc., 125 N.C. App. 235, 481 S.E.2d 88 (1997), affd, 348 N.C. 260, 498
S.E.2d 602 (1998).
6. Id. at 236, 481 S.E.2d at 89.
7. Id.
8. Poole, 348 N.C. at 264, 498 S.E.2d at 604.
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court allowed the plaintiff to recover the full extent of her damages
due to her peculiar susceptibility to matters that cause severe emo-
tional distress.9 Thus, for the first time, the North Carolina Supreme
Court recognized the application of the "thin skull" rule in mental
injury cases.
Compared to a physical injury that can be objectively diagnosed
and treated, a mental injury may be completely subjective in its diag-
nosis, origin, and treatment. As a result, this new application of the
"thin skull" rule to mental injury cases may create a flood of claims
alleging that present outrageous conduct has caused a past traumatic
event to resurface. Due to the greater damage to the plaintiff caused
by the exacerbation of the past trauma, the damages awarded by ju-
ries may be higher. Increased damages awards may also attract plain-
tiffs with potentially frivolous and fraudulent claims of traumatic
flashbacks. As a result, the North Carolina Supreme Court should
establish boundaries and limits in the "thin skull" rule's application to
pre-existing mental injuries.
This note will first discuss the opinion of the North Carolina Su-
preme Court in Poole v. Copland, Inc., focusing on the recognition of
a new application of the "thin skull" rule. Part II will trace the history
and application of the "thin skull" rule in North Carolina and other
jurisdictions. Finally, this note will analyze the Poole v. Copland, Inc.
decision and how it may affect the torts of intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress in North Carolina and tort law in gen-
eral. In addition, the decision's effects on the practitioner of law in
North Carolina will be discussed.
THE CASE
In Poole v. Copland, Inc., the plaintiff, Wendy Poole, sued John
Haynes for intentional infliction of emotional distress."° She also
brought an action against Copland, Inc., her former employer, for rati-
fication of Haynes' conduct and its imputed liability with respect to
Haynes' sexual harassment." Poole testified that throughout a one-
year period, while working for Copland, Haynes intimidated and sexu-
ally harassed her.12 On many occasions, Haynes made obscene sexual
suggestions and gestures toward the plaintiff.' 3 As a result, Poole tes-
tified that she could not eat or sleep, and suffered from intestinal
9. Id.
10. Poole, 125 N.C. App. at 236, 481 S.E.2d at 89.
11. Id.
12. Poole, 348 N.C. at 261, 498 S.E.2d at 603.
13. Id. at 261-62, 498 S.E.2d at 603.
2001]
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problems.' 4 Moreover, Poole's relationship with her husband became
strained.'" Poole reported Haynes' behavior and harassment to super-
visors on numerous occasions, but the claims were not investigated. 6
Poole also testified to years of sexual abuse as a child and teen-
ager.1 7 This past sexual abuse included: sexual molestation by a
neighbor when she was nine, giving birth to an illegitimate child at
fifteen, physical abuse by her drug-addict husband whom she married
at sixteen, and molestation by her uncle at the age of eighteen.18
Poole's father, an alcoholic, physically abused her during childhood.19
During a two-week period, a friend of her father's bound her with
duct tape, locked her in a closet, and brutally raped her.2°
Two psychiatrists and a psychologist testified that Haynes' conduct
led to Poole's post-traumatic stress disorder and dissociative disor-
der.2' A dissociative disorder occurs when a person who has suffered
a bad experience does not store the bad experience as a memory, but
rather splinters the memory into several parts in order to not remem-
ber the experience.22 A subsequent traumatic event, such as sexual
harassment in the workplace, may cause the splintered parts to reu-
nite, and the person remembers the prior bad experience as a
flashback.23
At the trial level in the Superior Court of Alamance County, the
jury found in favor of Poole on the issue of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.24 The jury awarded $2,000 actual damages and
$5,000 punitive damages against Haynes and $50,000 actual damages
and $250,000 punitive damages against Copland.25 Copland appealed
the ruling.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals disagreed with Copland's
contention that the "thin skull" rule applied only to physical and not
mental injuries and saw no reason to treat mental injuries any differ-
21ently than physical injuries. The court of appeals held that the "thin
skull" rule applied to tortious conduct that exacerbated a pre-existing
mental condition.27 However, the court of appeals ordered a new trial





19. Id. at 262-63, 498 S.E.2d at 603.
20. Id.
21. Poole, 125 N.C.App. at 238-39, 481 S.E.2d at 88-89.
22. Poole, 348 N.C. at 263, 498 S.E.2d at 603-04.
23. Id.
24. Poole, 125 N.C.App. at 235, 481 S.E.2d at 88.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 244, 481 S.E.2d at 94.
27. Id.
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based on the trial court's improper jury instructions, which unfairly
prejudiced the employer.28 After granting discretionary review, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the ruling on the "thin
skull" doctrine, but reversed on the issue of jury instructions, holding
that the instructions were proper.29
BACKGROUND
An English court first articulated the term "thin skull" or "eggshell
skull" in 1901. 30 However, the doctrine's use in the United States pre-
ceded its designation as the "thin skull" rule in Great Britain. In
Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R.,31 the court stated that "the defendant must
answer for the actual consequences of that wrong to her as she was,
and cannot cut down her damages by showing that the effect would
have been less upon a normal person."32 The "thin skull" doctrine has
been in wide use and acceptance throughout this century, and nearly
all legal texts or treatises 33 and jurisdictions34 have accepted and ap-
plied the "thin skull" rule in some form or manner to negligence cases.
There is almost universal agreement that a defendant is liable for
the full extent of the victim's damages when her negligence aggravates
a pre-existing physical condition.35 In other words, the defendant
takes the plaintiff as she finds him.36 However, not all legal authori-
ties or jurisdictions have applied the "thin skull" doctrine when the
pre-existing condition consists of a mental injury or disorder.37
28. Id. at 245, 481 S.E.2d at 94.
29. Poole, 348 N.C. at 265-66, 498 S.E.2d at 605.
30. Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669, 679 (1901).
31. 52 N.E. 747 (Mass. 1899).
32. Id. at 748 (emphasis added) (citing Braithwaite v. Hall, 46 N.E. 398 (Mass. 1897)).
33. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 (1979); 57A AM. JUR. 2d Negligence
§ 500 (1989); 22 AM. JuR. 2d Damages § 281 (1988); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 291-92 (5 h ed. 1984); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 261-
62 (4th ed. 1971).
34. See Schafer v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 897 (Colo. 1992) (holding that a defendant must ac-
cept the victim as he or she finds him); Benn v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1994) (holding
that "thin skull" doctrine applied to the aggravation of coronary heart disease); Walton v. Wil-
liam Wolf Baking Co., 406 So. 2d 168 (La. 1981) (holding that defendant was responsible for
compensating victim's predisposition toward neurosis); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.
1971) (holding that declining health exacerbated by automobile accident); Walsh v. Snyder, 441
A.2d 365 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (reversing trial court since it did not apply the "thin skull" doc-
trine); Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that trial court erred by not in-
structing the jury on the "thin skull" doctrine).
35. KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, § 43, at 291.
36. See Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 (1979) ("The negligent actor is subject to
liability for harm to another although a physical condition of the other which is neither known
nor should be known to the actor makes the injury greater."); Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568. 576
(5
t' Cir. 1991) (citations omitted) ("[T]he [thin skull] principle has been applied only to pre-
existing physical injuries. We decline the invitation to extend its scope, absent substantial indica-
tion that the state courts of Mississippi would do so.").
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While all do not agree, some legal texts and commentators specifi-
cally state that aggravated or exacerbated mental conditions, in addi-
tion to physical conditions, should be included in those injuries in
which the "thin skull" doctrine is applied.38 Also, numerous federal
and state jurisdictions have applied the "thin skull" rule to mental in-
juries.39 Louisiana has been especially proactive in applying pre-ex-
isting mental conditions or illnesses to the doctrine. In Walton v.
William Wolf Baking Co.,4 the victim was predisposed toward neuro-
sis, and "his reaction to the injury was more severe than that of most
people."'" The Louisiana Supreme Court held that this did not lessen
the defendant's "responsibility to compensate [the victim] for all the
consequences of the accident."42 Also in Thames v. Zerangue,43 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the "thin skull" rule was applica-
ble to a plaintiff with a history of underlying psychological problems,
which were aggravated by the accident in the case.44
In an extreme application of the rule to mental injury, the Louisiana
Court of Appeals in Giamanco v. EPE, Inc.45 held that a beauty salon
patron could recover damages for aggravation of a pre-existing psychi-
atric condition.46 The plaintiff developed a post-traumatic stress dis-
order after her hair was damaged by poor treatment at the salon.47
Testimony indicated that the victim was fixated on her hair and espe-
cially sensitive to her physical appearance.48 The court held that her
resulting mental problems were caused by the damage done to her
38. See 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.3, at 123 n.25 (2d ed. 1986)
(interpreting the thin skull doctrine to entail the victim's physical, mental, or financial condi-
tion); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 281 (1988) (a person is entitled to full compensation although
his injuries may have been aggravated by pre-existing mental conditions).
39. See generally McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498 (s Cir. 1996) (applying
the "thin skull" rule to pre-existing mental injuries); Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 81 (7
t
h Cir.
1993) ("It has long been the rule in tort law.., not only that the tortfeasor takes his victim as he
finds him, but also that psychological vulnerability is on the same footing with physical.");
Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217 (7
t
h Cir. 1983) (holding that victim's vulnerability be-
cause of psychological pre-existing condition rather than physical is irrelevant); Steinhauser v.
Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that a young girl predisposed to schizophrenia
could fully recover damages for the full-blown psychosis resulting from an accident); Reck v.
Stevens, 373 So. 2d 498, 502 (La. 1979) (holding defendants responsible for injuries accentuated
by pre-existing emotional instability); Therriault v. Swan, 558 A.2d 369 (Me. 1989) (recognizing a
special "eggshell psyche" rule for pre-existing emotional injuries); Richman v. Berkley (Dept. of
Public Works), 269 N.W.2d 555 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that accident resulted from ag-
gravation of plaintiff's pre-existing mental problems).
40. 406 So. 2d 168 (La. 1981).
41. Id. at 175.
42. Id.
43. 411 So. 2d 17 (La. 1982).
44. Id. at 19-20.
45. 619 So. 2d 842 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
46. Id. at 846.
47. Id. at 844.
48. Id. at 845.
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hair.49 The court refused to distinguish pre-existing physical condi-
tions from mental conditions, and stated that it is well-settled law in
Louisiana that a defendant takes a victim as he finds her. °
The manner in which Louisiana applies pre-existing mental condi-
tions or injuries5' differs from many of the states that do recognize
mental injuries, at least in regard to actions for emotional distress.5 2
In these other jurisdictions, recovery for intentional or negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress would be allowed so long as the mental
injury suffered is of "sufficient magnitude to cause a normally consti-
tuted person to be unable to adequately cope. '53 Conversely, in Loui-
siana a person can recover for emotional distress even if a person with
a normal sensitivity to the situation would not have been affected. 4
This allows a supersensitive person to recover damages from the
defendant.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has applied the "thin skull"
rule to physical injuries for the last thirty years. However, compared
to other jurisdictions, North Carolina has applied the "thin skull" rule
sparingly at the appellate level. There have been few cases decided by
the North Carolina appellate courts prior to Poole v. Copland, Inc.,
56
which have utilized the doctrine. 7
Although North Carolina had not previously applied the "thin
skull" doctrine to pre-existing mental injuries, the courts had not dis-
allowed its application. Instead, when the appellate courts of North
Carolina utilized the "thin skull" rule in earlier cases, it was only nec-
essary to apply the doctrine to pre-existing physical injuries." In Potts
49. Id. at 846.
50. Id. at 845.
51. See id. at 844.
52. See Theriault v. Swan, 558 A.2d 369 (Me. 1989) (recognizing a special "eggshell psyche"
rule for pre-existing emotional injuries); Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d
1282 (Me. 1988) (holding that "eggshell psyche" rule does not apply to the supersensitive plain-
tiff); Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096 (Wash. 1976) (disallowing damages for emotional distress
where plaintiff is exceptionally sensitive).
53. Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coher-
ence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583, 621 n.188 (1982).
54. Giamanco v. EPE, Inc., 619 So. 2d 842, 844 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
55. Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
56. 348 N.C. 260, 498 S.E.2d 602.
57. See Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964); Potts v. Howser, 274
N.C. 49, 161 S.E.2d 737 (1968); Holtman v. Reese, 119 N.C. App. 747, 460 S.E.2d 338 (1995);
Casey v. Fredrickson Motor Express Corp., 97 N.C. App. 49, 387 S.E.2d 177 (1990); Ballenger v.
Burris Indus. Inc., 66 N.C. App. 556, 311 S.E.2d 881 (1984); Wyatt v. Gilmore, 57 N.C. App. 57,
290 S.E.2d 790 (1982); Lee v. Regan, 47 N.C. App. 544, 267 S.E.2d 909 (1980): Hinson v. Spar-
row, 25 N.C. App. 571,214 S.E.2d 198 (1975); Redding v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 9 N.C. App. 406,
176 S.E.2d 383 (1970). All of the preceding cases applied the "thin skull" doctrine in North
Carolina to pre-existing physical injuries.
58. See cases cited supra note 57.
6
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v. Howser,59 the North Carolina Supreme Court, while utilizing the
"thin skull" rule to a pre-existing physical injury, stated that defend-
ants are liable for aggravating both pre-existing physical and mental
conditions.60 Numerous North Carolina cases have cited Potts when
applying the "thin skull" rule.6 Thus, North Carolina has recognized
the application of the doctrine to mental injuries in dicta for many
years. However, Poole was the first case holding that the rule applied
to mental conditions.
ANALYSIS
The North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Poole v. Copland,
Inc.62 is a new application of the "thin skull" rule in North Carolina.
Although the ruling in Poole is not a unique application of the doc-
trine in the United States,63 the "thin skull" rule's application to
mental injuries may have a great and lasting effect on tort law in
North Carolina and the manner in which practitioners approach many
negligence cases.
One effect the Poole ruling may have on tort law is that there may
be an increase in the number of intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims. This may be especially true when the plain-
tiff has been subjected to a traumatic event in her past. Plaintiffs may
allege that the present outrageous behavior has aggravated their pre-
existing mental condition or disease causing their damages to be much
greater than if they had not previously suffered from this condition.
Therefore, the lure of greater jury damages awards may increase the
number of emotional distress claims in the court system. Some courts
have suggested that jurors and judges can evaluate the impact of ag-
gravated mental conditions with no greater difficulty than evaluating
any intangible injury.64 However, a defendant is already responsible
for much more damage than was ever foreseeable 65 in his breach of
duty to the plaintiff when there is an aggravated physical condition.
Thus, applying the "thin skull" rule to mental injuries only compounds
the disproportionality that is inherent in the doctrine.66
59. 274 N.C. 49, 161 S.E.2d 737 (1968).
60. Id. at 54, 161 S.E.2d at 742.
61. See Hoffman v. Reese, 119 N.C. App. 747, 749, 460 S.E.2d 338, 341 (1995); Lee v. Re-
gan, 47 N.C. App. 544, 551, 267 S.E.2d 909, 913 (1980); Hinson v. Sparrow, 25 N.C. App. 571,
574, 214 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1975).
62. 348 N.C. 260, 498 S.E.2d 602 (1998).
63. See cases cited supra note 39.
64. Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Me. 1988).
65. KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, § 43, at 292.
66. The disproportionality refers to the greater burden of damages placed on the defendant
although the defendant had no prior information concerning the pre-existing condition. How-
ever, either the innocent plaintiff or the tortfeasor must take responsibility for the hidden vul-
7
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While the application of the "thin skull" rule to mental injuries may
increase the number of emotional distress claims in North Carolina,
the Poole court's decision to do so was logical. In Johnson v. Ruark
Obstetrics,6" the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that "'mental
injury' is simply another type of 'injury'-like 'physical' and 'pecuni-
ary' injuries."68 Also, the Poole court cited the North Carolina Pat-
tern Jury Instructions for Civil Cases, from the footnote to the
instruction for Proximate Cause-Peculiar Susceptibility, which defines
injury as including "all legally recognized forms of personal harm, in-
cluding activation or reactivation of a disease or aggravation of an
existing condition."69 Additionally, in Potts v. Howser70 the North
Carolina Supreme Court defined the "thin skull" rule as aggravating
or activating a pre-existing physical or mental condition.71 The Poole
court held that the "thin skull" rule could be applied to mental injury
cases and that defendants "may be liable for [the] aggravation or exac-
erbation of a preexisting mental condition."72 Thus, the court's deci-
sion was based on existing law and definitions of injuries (which
included mental injuries) that had not been previously applied to the
"thin skull" doctrine.
The Poole case only discussed the application of the "thin skull"
rule to mental injuries in cases of intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress.73 The Poole court stated that if the defendant's
actions could have reasonably been expected to injure a person of or-
dinary mental condition, the defendant would be liable for all harm,
although the damages may be unusually extensive due to the plain-
tiff's mental condition.74 Therefore, only the initial severe emotional
distress must be foreseeable in order to recover for the aggravated or
exacerbated emotional distress.
The court does not discuss the application of the "thin skull" rule to
mental injuries in cases not involving emotional distress. For example,
if a defendant's negligence in an automobile accident was a breach of
duty to an ordinary person, the plaintiff hypothetically could recover
both damages for physical injuries and any latent mental injuries ag-
nerability of the plaintiff. The fairness of the disproportionality is justified "by the fact that the
case law provides express notice of the thin skull doctrine." Lawrence Crocker, A Retributive
Theory of Criminal Causation, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 65, 79.
67. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
68. Id. at 292-93, 395 S.E.2d at 90 (quoting Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N.C. 370,
11 S.E. 1044 (1890)).
69. Poole v. Copland, Inc., 125 N.C. App. 235, 244, 481 S.E.2d 88, 94 (1997) (quoting
N.C.P.I., Civ. 102.20), affd, 348 N.C. 260, 498 S.E.2d 602 (1998).
70. 274 N.C. 49, 161 S.E.2d 737 (1968).
71. Id. at 54, 161 S.E.2d at 742.
72. 125 N.C. App. at 244, 481 S.E.2d at 94.
73. 348 N.C. 260, 264, 498 S.E.2d 602, 604 (1998).
74. Id. at 265. 498 S.E.2d at 605.
2001]
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gravated by the automobile accident. The Poole court does not ad-
dress this issue and makes no effort to limit the application of the
doctrine to emotional distress cases.
Some jurisdictions have limited the "thin skull" rule's application
where the flashback or aggravated emotional condition was only the
result of an "eggshell psyche" or a "super-sensitive" individual.75
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court has neither ruled on nor
discussed this application of the "thin skull" rule to pre-existing
mental conditions. As a result, it has not been determined whether
North Carolina will limit the doctrine's use in regard to mental inju-
ries" or take the more liberal view held by Louisiana."
The effects on practitioners in North Carolina could be great. Law-
yers representing plaintiffs should encourage their clients to disclose
any type of pre-existing mental condition, disease, or injury that may
have been aggravated or exacerbated by the defendant's breach of
duty. By disclosing and utilizing information regarding aggravated
mental conditions, advocates will enable their clients to recover more
fully for the injuries that they have as a result of the defendant's negli-
gence. For example, if a person is involved in an accident, and a latent
schizophrenic condition is aggravated by the accident,7" much higher
medical bills and other losses (i.e. loss of employment) may result. If
the plaintiff cannot recover for the exacerbated pre-existing mental
condition, the plaintiff will not recover the entire damages suffered at
the hands of the defendant. In Poole, the North Carolina Supreme
Court could have defined causes of actions that the "thin skull" doc-
trine could or could not be applied to in regard to pre-existing mental
conditions. However, the court did not. Thus, plaintiff's lawyers
should challenge the North Carolina appellate courts to do so while
advocating for the best interests of their clients.
Defense lawyers must be aware of the possible application of the
"thin skull" rule to pre-existing mental conditions by plaintiffs in cases
not involving emotional distress. In order to protect their clients' in-
terests, defense lawyers should fight this interpretation of Poole.7 9
Defendants should argue against expanding the "thin skull" doctrine
any further.
75. Therriault v. Swan, 558 A.2d 369 (Me. 1989) (recognizing a special "eggshell psyche"
rule for pre-existing emotional injuries).
76. See id.
77. See Thames v. Zerangue, 411 So. 2d 17 (La. 1982); Walton v. William Wolf Baking Co.,
406 So. 2d 168 (La. 1981); Giamanco v. EPE, Inc., 619 So. 2d 842 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
78. Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that a young girl
predisposed to schizophrenia could fully recover damages for the full-blown psychosis resulting
from an accident).
79. 348 N.C. 260, 498 S.E.2d 602 (1998).
9
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CONCLUSION
Physical injuries can be objectively diagnosed and treated, whereas
a mental injury is much more subjective in its origin, treatment, and
diagnosis. Nonetheless, mental injury is a form of harm for which a
victim should be compensated. However, expanding the "thin skull"
doctrine without boundaries to include pre-existing mental injuries
may create some dubious claims and disproportionate damages placed
on defendants. The Poole case's application of the "thin skull" rule to
mental injuries in emotional distress actions is not where the problem
lies. Since the court's analysis requires that the victim be an ordinary
person who would have suffered from severe emotional distress, the
aggravation of a pre-existing mental condition or disease is foresee-
able to the defendant.8" However, it is the lack of boundaries regard-
ing the rule's application to mental injuries that will cause confusion in
the interpretation of the law. If a plaintiff may recover for exacer-
bated latent mental conditions, even where severe emotional distress
is not foreseeable to a person of ordinary sensitivity, claims of past
traumatic flashbacks will undoubtedly rise. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court should place limits and establish boundaries on the use
of the "thin skull" rule to pre-existing mental injuries.
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